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ABSTRACT
Recent developments in public finance in the analysis of dynamic
government debt policies have emphasized effects on the distribution of
real resources across generations. At the same time, macroeconomists
have emphasized the importance of the length of the time horizon over
which agents optimize their decisions about consumption for judging the
effects of fiscal policy on aggregate demand. Much of the discussion of
these issues has focused on whether linkages among generations are
sufficient to give consumers infinite horizons. To the extent that
horizons are finite, debt burdens can be shifted to future generations,
and substitutions of debt for taxes have real effects.
This paper argues that, as a matter of quantitative significance,
theoretical and empirical emphasis on the importance of finite horizons
for the analysis of many fiscal policies is misplaced. Studies of the
role of finite horizons in determining the effects of short—run fiscal
policies on consumption have been conducted largely under the assumption
of perfect capital markets. We show that while the marginal propensity
to consume (MPC) out of temporary tax changes is nonzero in finite—
horizon models, it is not very large. We demonstrate that the MPC is,
however, quite sensitive to the importance of restrictions on borrowing
in the economy. The clear implication is that shifting emphasis from
the length of the planning horizon to the structure of capital markets
is an important step for empirical research.
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Recent developments in public finance in the analysis of tiynamic
government debt policies have emphasized effects on the distribution of real
resources across generations (Kotlikoff, 1984; Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987;
Rubbard and Judd, 1986). At the same time, macroeconomists have emphasized
the importance of the length of the time horizon over which agents optimize
their decisions about consumption for judging the effects of fiscal policy on
aggregate demand (Blanchard, 1985). Much of the discussion of these issues
has focused on whether linkages among generations are sufficient to give
consumers infinite horizons (see the discussion in Barro, 1974, 1978; Tobin,
1980; and Feldstein, 1982). To the extent that horizons are finite, debt
burdens can be shifted to future generations, and substitutions of debt for
taxes have real effects (Modigliani, 1961; Diamond, 1965; Blanchard, 1985).
This paper argues that, as a matter of quantitative significance,
theoretical and empirical emphasis on the importance of finite horizons for
the analysis of many fiscal policies is misplaced.' Studies of the role of
finite horizons in determining the effects of short—run fiscal policies on
consumption have been conducted largely under the assumption of perfect
capital markets. We show that while the marginal propensity to consume (MPC)
out of temporary tax changes is nonzero in finite—horizon models, it is not
very large. Poterba and Summers (1986) present evidence that short—term tax
reductions and government budget deficits have led to significant reductions
in national saving in recent years; such a finding is inconsistent both with
Ricardian equivalence and with the predictions of finite—horizon models under
perfect capital markets. We demonstrate that the MPC is, however, quite
sensitive to the importance of restrictions on borrowing in the economy. The
clear implication is that shifting emphasis from the length of the planning—2—
horizon to the structure of capital markets is an important step for empirical
research.2
The paper is organized as follows. We put forth an intertemporal
optimizing model of consumption emphasizing the role of finite lifetimes in
section II. The model allows for a stochastic transition from low earnings to
high earnings to facilitate analysis of effections borrowing restrictions on
the consumption of individuals with low current wages. We apply the model to
examinations of short—run fiscal policy in section III; the marginal
propensity to consume out of short—run tax cuts is modeled both in the
presence and absence of borrowing constraints. We demonstrate that the
estimates of the aggregate MPCdependcritically on both the importance of
borrowing restrictions and on the distribution of the tax reduction. Some
conclusions and implications are discussed in section IV.
II •FINITELIFETIMES, BORROWING CONSTRAINTS, AND CONSUMPTION
Toanalyze the relative importance of finite horizons and borrowing
constraints for the effects of temporary tax changes on consumption, we employ
a simple analytical model of an economy in which the number of births is
constant each year and each person has a probability p of dying each year.
This form of uncertainty about life expectancy is highly stylized and serves
only to create a finite—horizon problem, not to calculate age—related marginal
roi,ensities to consume per se (as for example in Hubbard, 1986). We capture
the essence of a rising lifetime earnings profile by assuming that each person
begins work earning a wage of w1 and has a probability q each year of
experiencing an increase in his wage to w9. In the steady state, the share of
the labor force in the high—productivity state is 02 =q/(p+q);the share in
the low—productivity state, 01 =p/(p+q).The total wage income going to—3—
low—productivity workers equals 01w1 per living person, and wage income to
high—productivity workers is 02w2 per capita.
All agents are assumed to have logarithmic utility functions defined over
consunrntion.3 If T is the time of death, utility is given by
(1) U =E{f ePtin c dt }•,
0
where p is the rate of time preference. This assumption simplifies exposition
because logarithmic utility implies that an individual's consumption in each
period is proportional to his stocks of human capital and financial assets in
perfect capital markets. More specifically, if h is the expected present
value of all future wage income and a is financial wealth, then the individual
consumption function c is
(2) c (p + p) (h + a).
To determine aggregate consumption, it is necessary to compute the human
capital of low— and high—productivity workers (1 and F!2, respectively).
Since a proportion pdt of current high—productivity workers die during the
interval (t,t + dt), and the market discounts future wealth at the interest
rate r, H2 obeys
(3) H2(t) =w2e2dt
+ (1 —rdt)(1—pdt)H2(t + dt).
This equation states that the current human capital of high—productivity
workers equals the current wage flow plus the present value of the expected
human capital of the current workers, who are a proportion 1 —pdtof high——4—
productivity workers dt units of time in the future.4 This can be expressed
as the differential equation
(4) H2—w202+(p+r)R2.
To determine H1, we must take into account both deaths and transitions to
high productivity. With probability qdt a low—productivity worker becomes
high—productivity, and with probability pdt dies. Hence the current low—
productivity workers are 1 —(p+q)dtof tomorrow's low—productivity
workers. The qdt proportion that become high—productivity workers comprise a
pdt proportion of all such workers tomorrow, and hence tomorrow will have pdt
of H2. Therefore,
(5) 14(t)= w1O1dt+(1—pdt)(1—rdt)f(1—qdt)H1(t +dt)
+pdt147(t +dt)J.
In differential equation form, this becomes
(6) H1 =—w101+(p+q+r) —
pH2.








wherec1(c2) is the average consumption of low— (high—) productivity
workers. The sum A +H1+H7is total wealth of the current population.—5--
We consider below the determination of aggregate consumption both in the
presence and absence of borrowing restrictions. Where capital markets are
perfect and there are no restrictions on borrowing,5 aggregate consumption C
is given by
(8) C =(p+p)(A++ H2).
In the steady state of the aggregate economy, H1, H2, and A assume the values
H1, H2, andA*, respectively, where
* p w qw-w p
(9) H1 =(p+q)(+'r
+( + q)(+ Cp+q+r'
*
(10) H = 22
,and
2p+r
* w(r—p) w—w pq+r—p
(11) A =
+p+r)(p +r)
+( +1p+2r (+ q3(q +p+
Weassume that r > p, so that A* > 0. The human capital of high—productivity
individuals is obtained by means of a simple present—value calculation. H1
is a weighted average of the discounted low—productivity earnings and later
high—productivity earnings, adiusted for transition probabilities.
Consider an individual entering the economy with no assets but with the
ability to borrow against future earnings. When he starts working, he has his





That is, h1 represents the discounted value of receiving w1 until death, plus
the discounted value of the difference until death between w2 and w1, times
the probability of reaching high productivity, q/(p +q),times the expected
discount factor at the time of that transition conditional on having reached
high productivity, (p +q)/(p+q+r).The inclusion of the second term in
h1 is due to the perfect capital market that allows the individual to borrow
against the future high—productivity wage stream. Desired consumption in the
initial period is
(13) c0 =(p+p)h1
=:1+ : — 1)(p+q +
Note that c0 > w1 if w2 is much greater than w1, or if q is large relative to
p +r.Intuitively, initial consumption exceeds the initial wage if the
initial wage is much smaller than subsequent wages or if the transition to
higher wages is especially rapid.
Many forms of borrowing restrictions are possible;6 we analyze the
constraint arising from a nonnegativity constraint on assets. In particular,
we appeal to transactions costs and bankruptcy laws in explaining credit
restrictions.7 As we will show, such constraints can influence behavior even
when consumption is not restricted by the level of current resources. That
is, the anticipation of binding constraints in the future can be important
(see also Zeldes, 1986).
If low—wage individuals cannot borrow against future high wages and
desired initial consumption exceeds the initial wage, consumption behavior is
substantially affected. For the case in which q is high and assets are zero
for constrained individuals, we need only examine and A in the aggregate
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In the steady state of the constrained system,
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As expected, the constrained equilibrium yields a greater steady—state asset
level, the increase equaling
w—w p q+r—p
(+2p+'rp +q q +r+p3
-
Thedifferenceis larger as the productivity difference and the proportion of
liquidity—constrained individuals is greater. The ratio of steady—state asset
levels in the constrained and unconstrained cases is
w—w pq+r—p p+r
p+q+r qq+r+p r—p
This effect is likely to be quantitatively important.8
It is important to note that even if individuals are unable to borrow
against future earnings, they maystillsave in the initial low—productivity
period. The following analysis determines the nature of paths of consumption
and asset accumulation for that case. Since consumption when the high—
productivity state is reached will be (p +p)[a+w2(p+r) if assets are—8—
a, the marginal value of assets at the moment of transition will be
(p +p)1[a+w2(p
+r)1]1'which is V'(a) if V(a) is defined to be the
value of assets in the high—productivity state. An individual in the low—
productivity state will therefore face the following problem:
(18) 7°_(P+P+)t{1c +qV(a)ldt,subject to
a =(r+p)a + — c.
This problem differs because the budget constraint does not include any
insurance payment a worker receives when he fails to move to high
productivity. That insurance was implicitly assumed above when we focused on
perfect capital markets. Intertemporal arbitrage arguments show that
2
qc
(19) c =(P+q—r)c (p +p)(a+hY
Phrase diagram analysis of (19) together with the budget constraint in
(18) reveals that there are two possible cases ——dependingon whether desired
initial consumption exceeds the initial wage. Figures 1 and 2 display those






Let c0 be the value of consumption on the c =0locus if a =0.The critical
condition distinguishing the two cases is how c0 compares to w1.C.
FIGURE 1
CONSUMPTIONAND ASSETS WHEN c0>v1
C
CFIGURE 2








Figure 1 illustrates the case wherein c0 > w1. The crucial feature here
is that the steady—state level of assets is unstable. Concavity of the
problem (18) implies that the optimal policy is continuous in assets. When
assets are zero, consumption must be just the wage or less. However, if
consumption at a =0were less than w1, the phase diagram shows that assets
would grow without bound and consumption would fall to zero, a situation which
contradicts the transversality condition at infinity. Hence, consumption at
a =0is exactly w1. This implies that the consumption—asset path is as
depicted by the curve S w1 in Figure 1. That path is computed by solving for
the reverse—time system starting at c =w1and a =0.
If, on the other hand, c0 < w1, Figure 2 obtains. Here, the consumption
path is some path, such as 3D, which lies between the a =0and c =0loci.
It can be determined by standard shooting methods. The differences between
the two cases are intuitive. If the prospective wage increase, w2/w1, and its
likelihood, q, are high, then the worker would like to consume against the
future income, but cannot. Hence, consumption is driven up to its upper
bound, w1, if he has no assets. This is the case depicted in Figure 1. In
Figure 2, the wage increase is not large or is not likely to occur soon. In
this case the borrowing constraint is not as binding and some savings will
occur.
Within this setup, we can consider more generally the impact of borrowing
restrictions on the marginal propensity to consume out of assets for low—
productivity workers. As before, let h1 represent human capital in the low—
wage state, i.e., the present value of future wages. We present in Table 1
simulated marginal propensities to consume out of assets for low—productivity
workers (expressed as a ratio to MPCs under perfect capital markets). Four
levels of initial assets relative to human capital are considered. ExpressingTABLE 1
MPCsINCONSTRAINEDREGIME RELATIVE TO PERFECT CAPITAL MARKETS
A =0.025h1
q/p
4 8 16 32
1.5 1.50 2.14 2.37 2.42
w21w12 2.59 3.39 4.12 4.49
5 3.29 4.48 6.21 8.17
A =0.075h1
q/p
4 8 16 32
1.5 1.07 1.20 1.18 1.05
2 1.58 1.88 1.93 1.65
5 2.22 2.84 3.56 3.78
A =0.15h1
q /p
4 8 16 32
1.5 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.00
w2/w1 2 1.24 1.32 1.25 1.07
5 1.79 2.11 2.23 1.89
A =0.3h1
q
4 8 16 32
1.5 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00
2 1.07 1.07 1.02 1.00
5 1.45 1.53 1.38 1.10
Note: In all cases, rip =1.25by assumption. Entries in the table represent
the ratio of the MPCunderborrowing constraints to the MPCunder
perfect capital markets.— 10—
assetpositions in this way removes any dependence on the time unit. For each
asset parameterization, we consider a set of values for w2/w1 (prospective
wage increases) and q/p (expressing the ease of transition to the high—wage
state).9 Again, the interpretation of the entries in Table 1 is such that for
upper left entry in the top panel, the MPC out of assets in the constrained
regime is 1.5 times as large as in the perfect—capital-market regime.
When we solve for consumption functions, we find that the borrowing
constraint does cause a substantial change in behavior. Over the cases we
examine, the MPC is increased significantly over reasonable levels of
assets. Below we consider the influence of borrowing restrictions on
calculations of the effects of short—run tax changes on consumption.
III•MODELINGTHEEFFECTS OF TEMPORARY TAX CHANGESONCONSUMPTION
FiniteHorizons,Borrowing Constraints, and the Effects of
Teaporary Tax Changes
The recent resurgence of arguments for the "Ricardian equivalence"
proposition that debt—financed tax cuts should have no effects on consumer
spending calls into question whether finite—horizon models ("life—cycle" or
otherwise) are adequate representations of decisionmaking about consumption.
The basic debate here is an old one. Under the basic version of the life—
cycle model with only a lifetime budget constraint, a temporary tax cut
followed by an anticipated offsetting tax increase should have no effect on
consumer spending. An obvious qualification is that the aggregate marginal
propensity to consume out of a temporary tax cut will be positive to the
extent that borrowing constraints affect a substantial number of consumers.'°
The effects of temporary tax changes on consumption are easily captured
in the model we have outlined. As we emphasize the role of borrowing




Supposethat taxes i(t) per capita are imposed at time t. Viewing such taxes
as reductions in the wage shows that the human capital of each current worker





Aspointed out by Blanchard (1985), debt—financed tax cuts are not neutral
even in the presence of perfect capital markets, since a reduction in current
taxation financed by higher taxation of future generations stimulates a
positive wealth effect for the current generation, causing its consumption to
rise.2
The pure finite—lifetimes effect (that is, under perfect capital markets)
of a short—run tax change is quite small, however. Suppose, for example, that
T(t) is decreased by di during the interval [O,t11, with a compensating tax
increase of ert2dT during the interval [t2,t1 + t2]. In that case, total
human capital net of taxes for individuals at t =0increases by
—(r+p)t —1 (1 —e2)(1 —e 1)(r + p) .Therefore,the marginal propensity to
consume out of a debt—financed tax cut, m, is
dC —pt2_______________ (21) m =
dT
=(p+ p)(l -e ) (1
—e
+ )
The marginal propensity to consume out of a tax cut involves the three
terms on the right—hand side of the equation. The first, (p + p), is the MPC
out of increments to wealth. The other two terms comprise the increment to
wealth. That increment is greater the longer the tax cut
is the delay before the compensating tax increase occurs.
of the tax cut during to,t11 is (1 —e(r+P)tl),(r + p).— 12—
ofthat is left after expected future taxes are considered. While (p ÷ p)/(r + p)
may very well be close to unity, the other terms are substantial only if p,
or t2 is large. For example, if p =0.02,p =0.015,r =0.04,t1 =5,
and t2 =20,we are considering a five—year tax cut financed with a twenty—
year delay, during which time people die at a rate of 2 percent a year. In
this case, the MPC out of a tax cut would be only about 0.05, even though we
postulated an extended tax cut financed with a relatively long delay.
Results in a liquidity—constrained regime are quite different. Consider
first the case outlined in Figure 1 where low—productivity workers consume
their wage. Then the impact of a tax cut is lust
(22) dC =
01dr1+ 02dr2,
where dr is the size of the tax cut for workers with wage wi. The aggregate
MPC out of the tax cut,
Odi +0 mdi
(23)
— 1 1 2 2
01dr1 + 02dr2
will be substantially higher. Suppose 01 =0.20and dT1 =dr2.The aggregate
M?C becomes 0.24, not 0.05; that is, the MPC is more than quadrupled by
assuming that only twenty percent of the work force is liquidity—constrained.'3
These findings are of particular interest for the debate over tests of
neutrality propositions. While finite horizons per se are not likely to he of
much significance for analyses of whether fiscal policy changes are neutral
with respect to aggregate demand, capital—market imperfections may be
quantitatively important in invalidating neutrality propositions.— 13—
Poterbaand Summers (1986) show that the large budget deficits of the
early 1980s were associated with substantial decreases in private saving,
rather than with an increase in private saving, as would be predicted by
neutrality propositions. Such a result is consistent with our calculations of
the potential importance of liquidity constraints in assessing the effects of
deficits on national saving. Two other possibilities here are that consumers
are simply myopic, or that it is the non—lump—sum nature of actual taxes that
accounts for the failure of Ricardian equivalence.
With respect to the first point, some individuals may be myopic, failing
to take into account future fiscal actions implied by current tax policy, or
they may be rule—of—thumb consumers, consuming a fixed proportion of
disposable income not consistent with the predictions of the life—cycle
model. However, if myopia rather than borrowing constraints accounted for
high MPCs on the part of some individuals, there is little reason to believe
that such behavior should be concentrated in particular groups —forexample,
the young or the poor. Empirical evidence from microdata suggests strongly,
however, that it is in particular families with low net worth who display
excess sensitivity of consumption to income relative to that predicted by the
life—cycle model under perfect capital markets (Runkle, 1984; Hayashi, 1985a;
Zeldes, 1985).14
Second, Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes (1986) consider the positive ?1PC
arising from the risk—sharing effects of progressive taxation. While the
aggregate MPCs out of temporary tax changes calculated here are significantly
larger than those under perfect capital markets (and finite horizons), they
are generally smaller than those calculated by Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes.
These variations are traceable to three differences. First, because many of
their calculations are performed within a two—period model, their perfect—— 14—
capital—marketsMPC is much larger than in our model. Second, while we
consider uncertainty regarding the transition to high earnings, earnings
uncertainty in Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes also encompasses the possibility of
future reductions in earnings. Third, Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes assume that
individuals start with no initial assets, amplifying the need for
precautionary saving and the MPC out of short—run tax changes.'5
As noted before, our analysis abstracts from distortionary taxes,
concentrating on the income effects of tax policy. Of course, real—world
taxes are not lump—sum and involve substitution effects as well. Ignoring
price effects is not likely to bias our examination of the relative
unimportance of finite horizons for the analysis of short—run fiscal policy.
For individuals who participate in capital markets, the opposing
redistribution and distortionary—tax effects modeled in Judd (1986)16 act to
cancel each other, since they pull consumption in opposite directions. These
opposing forces mitigate the impact of finite lifetimes for such consumers.
Liquidity—constrained consumers are not affected by changing saving
incentives, and will react strongly to net—of—tax income changes.
In summary, liquidity constraints seem the most promising reason
accounting for nontrivial marginal propensities to consume out of short—run
tax changes.
Returning to the more general case considered before —whereMPCs of
liquidity—constrained consumers are not necessarily equal to unity ——wecan





wherey corresponds to the ratio of the MPC in the constrained regime to the
MPC in the unconstrained regime (calculated for various cases in Table 1).
effects of the Distribution of Tax Cuts on Consuiiption
That MPCs are high for constrained consumers (as in Table 1), with the
implication that borrowing constraints are potentially important in assessing
the impacts of short—run tax changes on consumption, does not imply that MPCs
out of actual tax cuts will be large even if a significant fraction of the
population is constrained. As noted in Hubbard and Judd (1986), the
formulation of in in equation (23) highlights the importance of the
distribution of the tax cut relative to the effect arising simply from finite
horizons. Letting 8 =d12/dT1,
we can rewrite equation (23) as:





When dr1 and dr2 are not equal, liquidity constraints maybecomeless
important. For example, if instead of a uniform tax cut, low—income workers
enjoy a smaller absolute tax cut than high—income workers do ——bothcuts
financed separately by later increases in taxes in the same class —thenm
is reduced. Indeed, many changes in proportional or progressive tax systems
result in greater relative relief for the high—income group, dampening the
effects of borrowing constraints on the aggregate MPC out of a temporary tax
cut.
Consider for example a linear tax on earnings of the form
(26) =t(w.—a), 1 1— 16—
wheretdenotesthe (constant) marginal tax rate and ta is the exemption. In
such a tax system, 8 (w2 — — a).In the proportional tax case,
8 =w2/w1.
In Table 2, we illustrate the sensitivity of the aggregate MPC to changes
in the distribution of the proceeds of the tax cut ——consideringa uniform,
lump—sum tax cut (where dt1 =dr2
arid 8=1), a tax cut in a proportional system




For all cases, we calculate aggregate MPCs for a tax cut lasting five years to
be financed with either a ten—year delay or a twenty—year delay. As before,
we assume that w1 =0.7w2;in the progressive case, the exemption is
calibrated to be half of the earnings of a low—income individual. To preserve
comparability with the calculations discussed before, consumers with low
earnings (w1) are assumed to have no initial assets. The MPCs presented in
Table 2 show clearly the variation in the effects of tax changes on aggregate
demand according to their distributional characteristics. For example, when
twenty percent of the population is constrained, the aggregate MPC is reduced
by about one—third from 0.24 when the tax cut is uniform to 0.156 when the cut
is made in the progressive system defined above.
The dependence of the aggregate MPC on the structure of the tax cut
points up clearly the potential problems of using estimates of the effects of
temporary tax changes on consumption to make inferences about the significance
of liquidity—constrained consumers in the economy. If tax cuts were lump—sum
and uniform, econometric evidence on the effects of temporary tax changes on
consumption could be used to infer the importance of liquidity—constrained
consumers in the determination of aggregate consumption. However, even
holding constant the underlying fraction of the population with constrained
consumption, MPCs will vary substantially with respect to lump—sum,TABLE 2
SIMULATEDAGGREGATEMARGINAL PROPENSITYTO )NSUMER
OUT OF A TEMPORARY TAX aJTa
Fractionof Population Luiip—Su Tax Cutin TaxCutin
LiguidityConstrainedb TaxCutC Proportional Syste.td Progressive Systeise
Ten—Year Delay
0 2.7 % 2.7 % 2.7 %
10 12.4 8.8 7.8
20 22.2 14.5 13.5
25 27.0 17.5 16.6
Twenty—YearDelay
0 5.0 % 5.0 % 5.0 Z
10 14.5 10.8 10.0
20 24.0 16.3 15.6
25 28.8 18.9 18.6
Notes: aThe aggregate marginal propensity to consume is calculated for a five—year
tax cut financed by a ten—year delay or a twenty—year delay.
bEqual to 6.
CThat is, dt1 =dr2.
dThat is, 8
w2/w1.
eThat is, 8 =(w2
—
c)/(w1
—a),where the exemption is set equal to one—half
of the earnings of an individual in the low—wage state.— 17
proportional, and progressive tax reductions. In particular, to the extent
that many previous actual policy experiments involved temporary changes in
nonlinear tax systems, their effects on consumption would be small even in the
presence of a substantial number of liquidity—constrained consumers. This
result is likely to be important in future empirical tests of Ricardian
equivalence.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The issue of whether government budget deficits affect aggregate demand
lies at the center of debates over Ricardian equivalence in public finance and
macroeconomics. In particular, the length of the planning horizon over which
individual consumption decisions are made has been a major focus of
discussion. We use a simple finite—lifetime model to examine the relative
importance of capital—market imperfections (borrowing restrictions) and finite
horizons in analyzing Ricardian—neutrality propositions. While the model is
stylized, it captures most essential features required to consider these
issues. The findings are clear: Pure intergenerational wealth redistribution
effects, the focus of standard finite—life analyses, are in general small.
The theoretical analysis of short—run policy effectiveness arguments is more
affected by borrowing constraints than by considerations of finite
lifetimes. The kinds of tax policy experiments offered in practice, however,
do not permit inferences about the importance of constraints in determining
aggregate MPCs.
Our findings of small short—run effects of government deficits in finite—
horizon models under perfect capital markets do not, of course, imply that the
effects of deficits on the capital stock in the long run will be small (see
for example Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987). Webelieve,however, that— 18—
argumentsabout the relative unimportance of finite horizons relative to
imperfections in capital markets for analyzing effects of fiscal policy
changes on consumption can be extended beyond short—run policy exercises.
Just as ignoring capital—market imperfections can lead to an underestimate of
the MPC out of temporary tax changes, the opposite can be true for peraanent
intergenerational transfers facilitated by fiscal policy. For example, the
transfers accompanying the introduction of the social security system were
large and long—lasting (Feldstein, 1974; Hurd and Shovert, 1983), leading to
large predicted effects on consumption. Social security retirement annuities
are financed on a pay—as—you—go basis by a payroll tax, so that receipts
collected from the working population are used to pay benefits to retirees.
Explicit borrowing against future social security benefits is not permitted,
and when borrowing restrictions are important, liquidity constraints on young
workers are exacerbated by the payroll tax. The predictions for large
increases in consumption based on a finite—horizon model with perfect capital
markets are likely to be incorrect (Hubbard and Judd, 1985).— 19—
Notes
'Poterbaand Summers (1986) offer an empirical criticism of the application of
finite—horizon models to the analysis of Ricardian equivalence, noting that
wartime debt in the U.S. has historically been paid off sufficiently rapidly
as to avoid shifting debt burdens to future generations.
2Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes (1986) also emphasize a capital—market imper-
fection in this context, arising from individual's ability to insure against
(individual—specific) earnings uncertainty.
3For a discussion of the effects of borrowing restrictions on consumption in
more general finite—horizon (life—cycle) models with more general
specifications of preferences, see Hubbard and Judd (1986).
4mIs appeals to the assumption that the population is in a steady state in
which the number of transitions from low to high productivity equals the
deaths of high—productivity workers.
5We mean "perfect capital markets" to imply the ability both to borrowagainst
future earnings and to insure against a delayed transition into high
productivity and long life. For the purposes of this analysis, we assume the
existence of markets for annuities.
6Empirical evidence in support of the excess sensitivity of consumption to
changes in disposable income can be found in Hall and Mishkin (1982), Hayashi
(1982, 1985a), Flavin (1984), and Zeldes (1985).
-
7Thesource of borrowing restrictions can be important. Hayashi (1985b)
discusses conditions under which excess sensitivity traceable to borrowing
constraints from imperfect information in the credit market is not exploitable
by stabilization policy. The form of borrowing restrictions we stress will be
exploitable. In addition, the sort of collateral restrictions on loans to
borrowers under asymmetric information discussed in Calomiris and Hubbard
(1986) would be consistent with this analysis. Zeldes (1986) considers the
case wherein individuals are allowed to borrow against the "certain component"
of future resources.
8See for example Hubbard and Judd (1986).
9Recall that the ratio q/p is also related to the fraction of thepopulation
liquidity constrained, which is (1 +(q/p))
1=p/(p+q)
'0Empirical studies note at least some sensitivity of consumer spending to
temporary tax changes (see Okun, 1971; Blinder and Solow, 1974; Springer,
1975; Juster, 1977; Modigliani and Steindel, 1977; Blinder, 1981; Poterba and
Summers, 1986). Blinder and Deaton (1985) find that the short—run effects of
temporary tax changes correspond more closely to those predicted by the
permanent—income hypothesis.
11The effects of the capital—market imperfectionarising from missing markets
for insuring against individual—specific fluctuations in earnings have been
considered by Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes (1986) and by Feldstein (1986).— 20—
Barsky,Mankiw, and Zeldes demonstrate that progressive taxes on future risky
income can invalidate Ricardian equivalence and lead to a nonzero marginal
propensity to consume out of a debt—financed increase in disposable income.
Feldstein makes a more general point ——thatnonneutrality under earnings
uncertainty need not depend on the existence of non—lump—sum taxes. He shows
that, even with lump—sum taxes, inability of agents to forecast precisely
their future earnings implies that intergenerational redistribution toward the
current generation raises current consumption. As noted also focus on lump—
sum taxes in our case against Ricardian equivalence in the presence of
borrowing restrictions.
12Uncertainty over date of death is not the only source of nonneutrality when
capital markets are perfect. Weil (1985) shows that within a certain—lifetime
model, allowing for population growth invalidates the neutrality of
substituting debt for taxes. Generalizing the approaches of Blanchard and
Weil, Buiter (1986) finds that if and only if the sum of the population growth
rate and the probability of death each period is zero will neutrality hold.
'3Hubbard and Judd (1986) compared implied MPCs for both infinite—horizon
models (where p =0)and finite—horizon models under various assumptions about
the proportion of the population that is liquidity—constrained. The key
finding there was that the significant variation in aggregate MPCs stems
primarily from capital—market imperfections, and not from changes in the
planning horizon.
'41n addition, evidence from DeLorig and Summers (1986) suggests that liquidity
constraints were more important still in the U.S. economy prior to World War
II.
15As an additional point here, the reduction in marginal tax rates in the
current tax reform would reduce the risk—sharing feature of the tax system,
stimulating private (precautionary) saving in the Barsky—Mankiw—Zeldes
framework. This is inconsistent with the empirical evidence presented in
Poterba and Summers (1986).
16Judd (1986) shows in the context of a perfect—foresight representative—agent
model that a substitution of debt for taxes will often lead to an anti—
Keynesian result ——themarginal propensity to consume out of the tax cut is
negative. The argument is as follows: A tax cut today followed by a future
tax increase will increase the welfare cost of taxation, since the future tax
increase will depress the future capital stock, whereas the current tax cut
cannot increase the current capital stock. This adverse income effect on
current consumption accentuates the substitution, or price, effect arising
from the lowered cost of future consumption. Hence, both price and income
effects act to reduce consumption if taxes are temporarily reduced.— 21—
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